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The 1990 Iraqi invasion is without a doubt the defining moment in the modern history of
Kuwait. The event ushered in a new era for the small Gulf emirate and the modern Middle East.
Remarkably, the factors that contributed to Iraq’s 1990 invasion and the consequences resulting
from the first Gulf War were already incubating a decade earlier in Kuwait’s domestic and
regional affairs. Indeed, during the 1980s Kuwait was facing the very same threats that would
permeate the region over the next several decades: border tensions, Iraqi and Iranian regional
threats, domestic anxieties over Iranian-motivated Shīʿī agitations, Sunnī-Shīʿī suspicions, the
rise of conservative Islam, the importance (and dangers) of oil revenue, the reliance on regional
and international powers for defense, addressing the status of Palestinian expatriates in the
region, and resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Intriguingly, these very same challenges facing Kuwait during the 1980s were examined
in depth 30 years ago by the Middle East Research Institute in its 1985 Report on Kuwait,
reissued recently by Routledge. Studying the 1985 MERI Report on Kuwait strikingly reveals
that the Gulf state at the time was an incubator of domestic and regional tensions that would not
only lead to the 1990 Iraqi invasion but would also foreshadow the regional challenges facing the
Middle East today. Routledge’s republication of this study is thus a timely and welcome
endeavor that would aid our understanding of how the transformative challenges experienced by
Kuwait during the 1980s would come to fuel events in the 1990s and drive the crises of the
present.
The 1985 MERI Report on Kuwait delves into the political, social, economic, and
security dimensions of the small Gulf state during the 1970s and early 1980s. The report
examines the challenges, both historical and contemporaneous, that faced the Kuwaiti ruling
monarchy and how these challenges affected the state and its policies. It also provides intelligent
and sobering assessments on Kuwait’s future security prospects at the time.
The report is divided into four parts. Each part is further divided into many short
subsections ranging from one to four pages. The fourth and final part of the report is a 70-page
statistical appendix. The report has a table of contents but no index or bibliography. Furthermore,
the text is not supported by sources or footnotes, although the authors cite the sources for each
table in Part IV.
The first part of the report provides helpful background information on Kuwait. (It would
have been helpful if Routledge had provided an up-to-date introductory essay to provide some
historical context, one that would inform the reader of the changes and developments that
Kuwait has since experienced, considering it has been three decades since the report was initially
published.) One important statistic on Kuwait’s demography is the fact that Kuwaiti citizens in
1980 constituted only 41.5 percent of the population. A sizeable Palestinian minority comprised
22 percent of the population, in addition to a significant Shīʿī minority of 250,000 (the estimated
population of Kuwait in 1980 was 1.36 million [p. 3]). These powerful minorities, according to
the report, would come to play a significant part in the political and economic calculus of the alS ̣abāh ̣ family at both the domestic and the regional level.
Part II of the report constitutes, to any student of the modern Middle East, the most
important and prescient section of the work. The study details the political structure of Kuwait,
recent (early 1980s) developments in the emirate, and problems hindering stability, such as
domestic, regional, and international threats. On the domestic side, the authors convey the
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growing threat of radical Islam and Shīʿī grievances. Most significantly, though, is the study’s
informative analysis of the regional threats facing Kuwait during that period – Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report correctly deciphers these two neighbors as the
major threats to and determinants of the government’s foreign and domestic affairs. For a long
time, Iraq has asserted claims over territories in northern Kuwait. This had previously led to
many skirmishes and even exchanges of fire (and, of course, the eventual 1990 Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait). Post-1979 Iran, on the other hand, represented another serious regional threat,
especially through its policy of encouraging Shīʿī agitation in Kuwait. This, the report explains,
resulted in one of the most serious threats to Kuwait’s stability: the 1983 coordinated bombings
of foreign targets in Kuwait that were masterminded by Iraqi Shīʿī residents (although the report
fails to mention that these attacks included an assassination attempt on the ruling amir himself,
Shaykh Jābir al-S ̣abāh ̣). The Iranian threats were further compounded by Kuwait’s support of
Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War, leading to direct Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti territory and on oil
tankers bound to Kuwait in the Gulf waters. The report links the Iranian threats to domestic
religious tensions in Kuwait, where Sunnī-Shīʿī suspicions began to escalate after the 1979
Islamic Revolution, while Shīʿī Kuwaitis began to face discrimination in employment, army
positions, and government posts.
The report also describes in this section the sizeable domestic Palestinian minority and
how the government attempted to neutralize their grievances. It is noted frequently throughout
the study that the Palestinians faced discrimination in housing and employment. They were also
barred from becoming Kuwaiti citizens. In order to appease this important minority (and out of
genuine belief in the Palestinian cause), there was strong Kuwaiti support for the PLO both
regionally and internationally. Palestinians also formed a sizeable part of Kuwait’s growing
middle class, thus benefiting from the state’s prosperity despite legal barriers to citizenship.
The part continues to discuss socio-economic destabilizing elements within Kuwaiti
society. Although the government has a sizeable hand in the economy as a “merchant state” and
provides a comprehensive welfare system to Kuwaiti citizens, it was not able to fully absorb the
economic and social shocks of the 1982 al-Manākh stock market crash that resulted in rising
class divisions and resentments within Kuwaiti society. In concluding this part of the study, the
authors argue that oil, money, and the constant search for allies for defense purposes continued
to shape the state’s domestic and regional policies.
Part III and IV of the report deals with Kuwait’s economy. The report here is detailed and
full of statistics for political economists to mine through, while keeping language accessible to
the untrained reader. Central to the Kuwaiti economy is of course its oil revenue, especially
considering how little it costs to extract it (in 1983, the cost of production is only 25 cents on a
$29 barrel of oil!). The report provides macro-economic analysis explaining how oil sales
remained the major revenue source and stimulant for the al-S ̣abāh ̣ government. A section is
dedicated to development planning, including analysis of infrastructure building, followed by an
examination of the petroleum and industrial sector, agriculture, livestock, and fisheries. The
labor market is examined next in a section that illuminates the problems of limited Kuwaiti
manpower and the over-dependence on foreign labor (one major industrial firm had only 12
Kuwaitis in its workforce of 3,000 [p. 89]). The penultimate section in this part of the report
deals with Kuwait’s highly developed financial sector, while the final discussion addresses
international transactions. Part IV’s 70-page statistical appendix provides a reservoir of data on
almost all aspects of the state; it neatly complements Part III.
The report’s detailed analysis of Kuwait during the 1970s and 1980s should certainly be
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applauded. Even 30 years after it was first published, the study still presents a prescient picture
of the state’s challenges that poignantly unveils the conditions that had led, as we now know, to
the Iraqi invasion in 1990, and which continue to fuel the conflicts of our day. Nothing indicates
the report’s accurate prognosis more than the following quote: “Kuwait is ... vulnerable to
external events, particularly the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war ... Because of these destabilizing
forces, Kuwait will likely experience greater unrest than in previous years” (p. 17), a prediction
that would come to fruition only five years later with the 1990 Iraqi invasion.
An important issue absent in the discussion is the plight of South Asian migrant workers
in Kuwait. It is well known that this group experiences particularly harsh labor conditions and
even far greater discrimination than Palestinians or Shīʿites. Moreover, the plight of the
citizenship-less Bedouins (“Bidūn jinsiyya”) sedentarizing in Kuwait is not addressed, an issue
that is confronting Kuwaiti society today. Regrettably, the form also detracts from the content.
There is neither an introduction nor a conclusion in the report. Sources and footnotes are also
absent throughout the first three parts. Neither does the study include any maps, a particularly
striking omission, and the somewhat dated statistical appendix would benefit from graphs and
pie charts. Furthermore, the lack of diacritics is very distracting to any scholar of the Middle
East. The absence of diacritics prevents the reader from knowing the proper pronunciation of an
Arabic name or region. For example, Shuaiba on page 16 should be spelled “Shuʿayba.” On the
other hand, the island of “Bubayan” should be spelled “Būbayān.” Overall, though, these minor
matters should not detract too much from the insight of this work, especially in its excavation of
the major challenges that Kuwait had to deal with during the 1970s and 1980s, ones that proved
highly consequential to the history of both Kuwait and the entire region in the subsequent
decades and down to our present day.
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